What it does
Lets non-operators earn yield by sharing in validator rewards. Stake is bonded; delegator receives a share commission negotiated off-protocol.
§ Tokenomics · /tokenomics
ADM mechanics,
end to end.
ADM is native, 10-9-divisible, used for fees and staking. There is no fixed supply cap — issuance and burn balance over time. Launch phase ends at pool exhaustion or 5 years, whichever comes first.
§ 01 / Supply
Total supply.
No hard cap. Launch-phase pool plus post-genesis issuance net of fee burn.
Decimals
10-9
Genesis pool
100,000,000
Launch cap
5 years
Unclaimed at cap
destroyed
Unclaimed pool at the 5-year time cap is destroyed, not redistributed. Preserves the no-insider-allocation property (WP §10.2.4).
§ 02 / Emission
Post-genesis schedule.
When the pool drains, issuance switches to a fixed schedule. No governance lever; only hard-fork revision.
| Phase | Rule | Source | Cap |
|---|---|---|---|
| Launch (0–5y) | Genesis pool drain · burn-to-mint + validator emission | Pool | 100 000 000 ADM |
| Post-genesis · A | Fixed-schedule validator emission (whitepaper §11.3) | Issuance | declining curve |
| Post-genesis · B | Fee burn on transparent dimension; net-zero issuance target | Burn | asymptotic |
§ 03 / Fees
Multi-dimensional fee market.
Compute, bandwidth, state, mempool, disclosure — priced separately. Base fee burned (EIP-1559-style).
| Code | Dimension | Unit | What it pays for |
|---|---|---|---|
| F.01 | Compute | gas-equivalent | Verifier-cycles for proof checks + signature ops. |
| F.02 | Bandwidth | bytes published | On-DAG bytes; encrypted payloads priced by ciphertext size. |
| F.03 | State | commitment slots | New shielded notes or transparent UTXOs added to the state commitment. |
| F.04 | Mempool | encryption regime | Threshold regime is cheaper than VDF; VDF surcharges when active set < 15. |
| F.05 | Disclosure | kB decrypted | Optional. Paid only when a view-key disclosure is published on-chain. |
Under sustained use, fees burned approximately equal new issuance, producing rough stability with mild deflation (WP §10.1.2).
§ 04 / Stake
Stake floors.
Node Runner
1 000 ADM
Self-bond + delegations both count. 28-day unbonding. Subject to liveness, equivocation, double-sign slashing.
Node Watcher
100 ADM
Uncapped set. 7-day unbonding. Slashable for false attestations.
§ 05 / Slashing
Slashing conditions.
| Code | Condition | Penalty | Bond | Detection | Recovery |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| S.01 | Double sign | 100% of bond | forfeit | Two signed headers same height | None — exit only. |
| S.02 | Liveness failure | 0.05% per missed epoch (capped 5%) | partial | No attestation in finalised window | Resume; bond regenerates over 30 epochs. |
| S.03 | Equivocation (DAG) | 50% of bond | forfeit half | Conflicting DAG vertices | Reduced — slot transferable. |
| S.04 | Censorship (mempool) | 10% of bond | partial | Threshold quorum signs censorship proof | Probationary 60 epochs. |
| S.05 | Watcher false claim | 100% of bond (watcher) | forfeit | Refuted attestation | None for watcher; validator unaffected. |
§ 06 / APR
Validator APR · interactive.
Drag the inputs. The calculator uses the launch-phase emission model (30M ADM drained over ~2 years at the ceiling). Real numbers will replace this on mainnet.
ADM / epoch
—
ADM / year
—
APR on self-bond
—
Validator selection is first-come-first-served (WP §8.1.3); delegation affects economics not selection. More delegated stake = larger share of validator rewards, same probability of being in the active set.
§ 07 / Delegation
Delegation.
Slashing exposure
Delegators are slashed pro-rata with the validator. Choose validators with public uptime records and known operational discipline.
Unbonding
28-day unbonding period (Node Runner), matching the validator. Withdrawn stake is locked through this window — slashable in retrospect during it.
Selection-neutral
Delegation does not affect a validator's position in the active set. The mechanism rewards continuity and registration order, not stake size.